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We showthat the effects of taxes on labor supply are shaped by interactions
between adjustment costs for workers and hours constraints set by firms. We de-
velopamodelinwhichfirmspostjobofferscharacterizedbyanhoursrequirement
and workers pay search costs to find jobs. We present evidence supporting three
predictionsofthismodelbyanalyzingbunchingatkinksusingDanishtaxrecords.
First, larger kinks generate larger taxable income elasticities. Second, kinks that
applytoalargergroupofworkers generatelargerelasticities. Third, thedistribu-
tionofjoboffersistailoredtomatchworkers’aggregatetaxpreferencesinequilib-
rium. Ourresults suggest that macroelasticities maybesubstantiallylargerthan
the estimates obtained using standard microeconometric methods. JEL Codes:
H20, J20.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thevast theoretical andempirical literatureontaxationand
labor supply generally assumes that workers can freely choose
jobs that suit their preferences. This paper shows that the effect
of taxes on labor supply is shapedby twofactors that limit work-
ers’ ability to make optimal choices: adjustment costs and hours
constraints determinedendogenously in equilibrium. We present
quasi-experimental evidence showing that these forces attenuate
microeconometricestimates of labor supply elasticities.
To motivate our empirical analysis, we develop a stylized
labor supply model with job search costs and endogenous hours
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 750 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
constraints. We model hours constraints by assuming that each
firm requires its employees to work a fixed number of hours be-
causeofanex-antecommitmenttoaproductiontechnology.Work-
ers draw offers from the aggregate distribution of hours and can
searchforjobs that offerhours closertotheirunconstrainedopti-
mumbypayingsearchcosts. Weconsidertwotypesofequilibrium
in the labor market: competitive markets and collective bargain-
ing. Inthecompetitivecase, bothworkersandfirmsarepricetak-
ers. Inthecollectivebargainingcase– whichis morerelevant for
ourempirical application– unions bargainwithfirms overwages
andtheaggregatehours distribution. Underbothnotions ofequi-
librium, the number of jobs postedby firms at each level of hours
mustequalthenumberofworkerswhoselectthosehoursafterthe
searchprocessiscomplete. Theaggregatedistributionofworkers’
preferences therefore determines the hours constraints imposed
by firms in equilibrium. However, most individuals do not work
their unconstrained optimal number of hours because of search
costs.
Ourmodelproducesadivergencebetweenmacrolaborsupply
elasticities(definedastheeffectonaveragehoursofworkofvaria-
tionintaxes across economies)andmicrolaborsupplyelasticities
(definedastheeffectoftaxchangesorkinksinnon-lineartaxsys-
tems that affect subgroups of workers). We show that the macro
elasticity always equals the “structural” labor supply elasticity
ε, the parameter of individuals’ utility functions that determines
elasticities absent frictions. In contrast, micro elasticities are
attenuated relative to ε because of search costs and hours
constraints.
The model generates three testable predictions about how
searchcosts andhours constraints affect thelaborsupply(ortax-
able income) elasticities observed in microstudies. All three pre-
dictionsholdirrespectiveofwhetherthelabormarketequilibrium
is determined by competition or collective bargaining. The first
prediction is that the observed elasticity increases with the size
of the tax variation from which the estimate is identified. Intu-
itively, large tax changes prompt more individuals topay search
costs and find a new job. Analogously, larger kinks induce more
individualstopaysearchcoststofindajobthatplacesthematthe
kink. Second, theobservedelasticityincreaseswiththenumberof
workersaffectedbyataxchangeorkink. Changesintaxesinduce
changes inlaborsupplynot just bymakingindividuals searchfor
different jobs, but also by changing the equilibrium distribution
 
a
t
 
H
a
r
v
a
r
d
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
o
n
 
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
 
2
6
,
 
2
0
1
2
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
q
j
e
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 ADJUSTMENT COSTS AND LABOR SUPPLY ELASTICITIES 751
of hours. Because changes in taxes that affect a larger group of
individuals induce larger changes in hours constraints – either
through market forces or directly through unions – they gener-
ate larger observed elasticities. Furthermore, tax changes may
affect even the labor supply of workers whose personal tax in-
centives are unchanged by distorting their coworkers’ incentives
and inducing changes in hours constraints. Finally, the model
predicts a correlation between individual responses to tax and
responses totaxes inducedby aggregation of workers’ tax prefer-
ences through firms or unions. In particular, one should observe
larger distortions in the equilibrium distribution of job offers in
sectors or occupations where workers themselves exhibit larger
taxelasticities.
We test these three predictions using a matched employer-
employee panel of the population in Denmark between 1994 and
2001. This dataset combines administrative records on earnings
andtaxableincome,demographiccharacteristics,andemployment
characteristics such as occupation and tenure. There are two
sourcesoftaxvariationinthedata:taxreformsacrossyears,which
producevariationinmarginalnet-of-taxwageratesof10% orless,
andchanges intaxrates across taxbrackets withina year, which
generatevariationinnet-of-taxwages of upto35%. Wefocus pri-
marily on the cross-bracket variation in taxes rates because it is
larger and applies to large subgroups of the population, permit-
tingcoordinatedresponses. Inparticular, weestimatetaxablein-
come elasticities by measuring the amount of bunching at kink
points, as in Saez (2010).1
Consistent with the first prediction, the elasticities implied
by the amount of bunching at large kinks are significantly larger
than those implied by the amount of bunching at smaller kinks.
There is substantial, visually evident excess mass in the wage
earnings distribution around the cutoff for the top income tax
bracket in Denmark, at which the net-of-tax wage rate falls by
approximately 30%. There is little excess mass at kinks where
thenet-of-taxwagefallsby10%, andnoexcessmassatkinksthat
generate variation in net-of-tax wages smaller than 10%.
1. Followingthemodernpublicfinanceliteraturereviewedin Saez, Slemrod,
andGiertz(2009),weproxyfor“laborsupply”usingtaxableincome.Wediscussthe
implications of measuring taxable income elasticities insteadof hours elasticities
below.
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 752 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Similarly, we find no changes in earnings around the small tax
reforms that change net-of-tax wages by less than 10%. The ob-
served elasticities at the largest kinks are several times larger
than those generated by smaller kinks and tax reforms across a
broadrangeofdemographicgroups,occupations,andyears.Using
aseriesofauxiliarytests,weshowthatthedifferencesinobserved
elasticities aredrivenbydifferences inthesizeofthetaxchanges
rather than heterogeneity in elasticities by income levels or tax
rates.
Totest the secondprediction, we exploit heterogeneity in de-
ductions across workers. In Denmark, 60% of wage earners have
zero deductions. These workers reach the top tax bracket when
theirwageearnings exceeds thetoptaxcutofffortaxableincome,
which we term the “statutory” top tax cutoff. Workers with large
deductions or non-wage income, however, reach the top tax
cutoffat different levels ofwageearnings andthus haveless com-
mon tax incentives. We first demonstrate that firms and unions
cater to the tax incentives of the most common workers. In par-
ticular, the mode of occupation-level wage earnings distributions
has an excess propensity tobe located near the statutory top tax
cutoff.2 Importantly, the wage earnings distribution even for
workers whohavesubstantial deductions ornon-wageincomeex-
hibits excess mass at the statutory top tax cutoff. Because these
workers do not face any change in marginal tax rates at the
statutorycutoff,thisfindingconstitutesdirectevidencethatwage-
hours offers are tailored to the tax preferences of the majority of
workers whohavesmall deductions. Welabel this supply-sidere-
sponse to tax incentives induced by the aggregation of workers’
tax preferences “aggregate bunching”.
Although aggregate bunching is an important source of be-
havioral responses to the tax system, some of the bunching at
kinksisdrivenbyindividualworkerssearchingforjobsthatplace
themnearthetoptaxkink. Toisolateandmeasuresuch“individ-
ual bunching,” we exploit a cap on tax-deductible pension contri-
butions, which is on average DKr 33,000 in the years we study.
Approximately 3% of workers make pension contributions up to
this amount and therefore cross into the highest income tax
2. We focus on wage earnings distributions at the occupation level because
most workers’ wages areset throughcollectivebargains at theoccupationlevel in
Denmark.
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bracket when they earn DKr 33,000 more than the statutory top
tax cutoff. We find that this pension-driven kink induces excess
mass in the distribution of wage earnings at DKr 33,000 above
thetoptaxcutoff. This excess mass appears tobedrivensolelyby
individual job search, as there is no excess mass at the pension-
driven kink for workers with small deductions. Because of aggre-
gatebunching, workers withcommontaxpreferences (thosewith
smalldeductions)haveahigherpropensitytobunchatthetoptax
kinkthanthosewithuncommontaxpreferences(thosewithlarge
deductions).
Wetest thethirdpredictionbyestimatingthecorrelationbe-
tweenindividual andaggregatebunchingacross occupations. We
find that there is more bunching at the statutory kink in occu-
pations whereworkers exhibit moreindividual bunchinginwage
earnings at the pension-driven kink. Although this result cannot
be interpreted as a causal effect because the variation in indi-
vidual bunching is not exogenous, it is consistent with the pre-
diction that firms and unions cater to workers’ aggregate tax
preferences.
Alloftheresultsaboveareobtainedforwageearners. Wean-
alyze self-employed individuals separately. As the self-employed
donot face significant adjustment costs or hours constraints, one
would expect that none of our three predictions should hold for
thissubgroup.Indeed,wefindthattheself-employedexhibitsharp
bunching at both small and large kinks, show no evidence of ag-
gregate bunching at the statutory kink, and are equally likely to
bunch irrespective of their deductions. These placebo tests sup-
port our hypothesis that search costs and hours constraints are
thekeyfactors that attenuatemicroelasticityestimates forwage
earners.
Although our findings showthat adjustment costs andhours
constraints arelikelytodampenobservedelasticities, theydonot
identify the underlying structural elasticity ε relevant for macro
comparisons. Identifying ε wouldrequire estimating a structural
model of labor supply with frictions and endogenous hours con-
straints. Such an analysis is outside the scope of this paper, but
two observations suggest that the structural elasticity ε is likely
to be an order of magnitude larger than the observed elastici-
ties in our data, which are below 0.02. First, calibrations of our
stylized model consistently imply values of ε an order of magni-
tude larger than the observedelasticities at the topkink (Chetty
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 754 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
etal. 2009). Second, theselfemployedexhibitmuchlargertaxable
incomeelasticitiesthanwageearners,suggestingthatindividuals
do seek to optimize relative to taxes when they face fewer
frictions.3
Our results could help explain why macrostudies find much
larger elasticities than microeconometric studies (Blundell and
MaCurdy 1999; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2009; Chetty 2011).4
Microestimatesareattenuatedbyfrictionsbecausetheyareiden-
tifiedfromindividuals’ responses tochanges intaxrates orkinks
after obtaininga jobneartheiroptimum. Incontrast, macrovari-
ation in tax rates across countries changes the jobs individuals
search for and the jobs offered by firms to begin with, produc-
ing larger elasticities.5 Our explanation for the gap between mi-
croandmacroelasticities complements recent work arguing that
macroelasticities arelargerbecausetheyincorporatebothexten-
siveandintensivemarginresponses(e.g. RogersonandWallenius
2009). Much of the difference in labor supply across countries
with different tax regimes is driven by hours worked conditional
on employment (Davis and Henrekson 2005; Chetty et al. 2011).
Thatis, macroestimatesofintensive margin elasticitiesaremuch
largerthantheirmicroeconometriccounterparts. Ouranalysisex-
plains this divergence between intensive margin elasticities. We
caution, however, that our findings do not provide justification
for the very large elasticities (e.g. ε>1) used in some macro
models.
In addition to the literature on micro vs. macro elasticities,
our study builds on and contributes to several other strands of
the literature on labor supply. First, previous work has proposed
that adjustment costs and hours constraints affect labor supply
decisions (e.g. Cogan 1981; Ham 1982; Altonji and Paxson 1988;
Dickens and Lundberg 1993; Rogerson 2005) and that long-run
3. This finding is consistent with a recent literature that documents larger
elasticities for workers whocan control their hours more easily, such as stadium
vendors(Oettinger1999),bikemessengers(FehrandGoette2007),andcabdrivers
(Farber 2005).
4. A recent microeconometricstudy that uses the same Danish microdata as
we dohere (Kleven and Schultz 2010) estimates an elasticity of zeroby studying
tax reforms over a twenty year period.
5. Frictions couldalsoexplain why macrostudies findlarge (Frisch) elastici-
tieswhenanalyzingfluctuationsinlaborsupplyoverthebusinesscycle. Intertem-
poralwagefluctuationsarelargeforcertainsubgroupsandmuchofthefluctuation
in hours at business cycle frequencies is on the extensive rather than intensive
margin (Chetty 2011).
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elasticities may differ from short-run elasticities (Holmlund and
S¨ oderstr¨ om2008).6 Ourcontributionis toshowhowthesefactors
affect estimates of intensive-margin labor supply elasticities us-
ing quasi-experimental methods. Our findings also support the
hypothesis that the effects of government policies may operate
throughcoordinatedchangesinsocialnormsorinstitutionsrather
than individual behavior (e.g. Lindbeck 1995; Alesina, Glaeser,
andSacerdote 2005).
Second, our results contribute tothe literature on non-linear
budget sets (e.g., Hausman 1981; Moffitt 1990; MaCurdy, Green,
and Paarsch 1990), where the lack of bunching at kinks creates
problems in fitting models to the data. As noted by Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999), “...for the vast majority of data sources cur-
rentlyusedintheliterature, onlya trivial numberof individuals,
ifindeedanyat all, report [earnings]at interiorkinkpoints.”The
kinks examinedinprevious studies aregenerallymuchsmaller–
both in the change in tax rates at the kink and the size of the
group of individuals affected – than the largest kinks studied
here.
Third, our analysis relates to recent work on taxable in-
come as a measure of labor supply (Feldstein 1999; Slemrod and
Yitzhaki 2002; Chetty 2009). The bunching we observe is driven
by changes in wage earnings rather than tax avoidance via pen-
sion contributions or evasion. However, because our dataset does
not contain information on hours of work, we cannot rule out the
possibility that some of the responses we observe arise from in-
come shifting. Importantly, distinguishing income shifting from
hours of work is not critical for the conclusions we drawhere, as
our three predictions also apply to an environment with adjust-
ment costs andcoordination constraints in income shifting.
Thepaperis organizedas follows. InSectionII, weset upthe
model, define micro and macro elasticities formally, and derive
thetestablepredictions. SectionIIIdescribestheDanishdataand
providesinstitutionalbackground. SectionIVpresentstheempir-
ical results. Section V concludes.
6. Our paper differs from the recent work of Chetty (2011) in two ways.
First, while Chetty (2011) derives bounds on elasticities under the assumption
that individuals face adjustment costs, we provide direct empirical evidence that
adjustment costs affect observed elasticities within a single economy. Second,
Chetty(2011)focuses exclusivelyonworkerbehavior, whilewemodel endogenous
hours constraints andfirm/union responses in equilibrium.
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II. SEARCH COSTS AND HOURS CONSTRAINTS
IN A LABOR SUPPLY MODEL
This section develops a stylized model of labor supply on the
intensive-margin whose purpose is to highlight the channels
through which frictions affect labor supply elasticities. We ana-
lyzea staticmodel becauseourempirical analysis focuses onhow
search costs andhours constraints interact in equilibrium rather
than on the dynamics of adjustment in labor supply. We present
someresultsonresponsestotaxreformsinatwo-periodextension
of this stylizedmodel in Online Appendix A.7
II.A. Setup
Firms. Firms have one-factor linear production technologies.
Eachfirmemploysasingleworkertoproducegoodssoldatafixed
pricep. Letw(h)denotethehourlywageratepaidtoworkerswho
work h hours in equilibrium. Firm j posts a job that requires hj
hours ofworkat thewageratew(hj). Wemodel hours constraints
by assuming that a firm cannot change the hours it posts after
matchingwithaworker.8 This assumptioncaptures theintuition
that firms sink capital in a technology that requires a certain
amount of labor for production before hiring workers. Such con-
straints may emerge from technological benefits of coordinating
workschedules (as inanassemblyline), thefixedcosts ofrestruc-
turing job and benefit packages, or regulations such as overtime
pay requirements.9
A firm that posts a jobwith hj hours earns profit
πj = phj − w(hj)hj.
Lettheaggregatedistributionofhoursofferedbyfirmsbedenoted
by a cdf G(h). A key feature of our model is that the aggregate
7. All appendix material is available online at http://qje.oxfordjournals
.org/.
8. This model is isomorphic to one in which a single firm offers heteroge-
neous hours packages and workers face costs of switching jobs within the firm.
This is because the boundary of a firm is indeterminate with constant returns to
scale.
9. We focus on hours constraints in the model for simplicity, but they should
beinterpretedmorebroadlyastechnologicalconstraintsonjobcharacteristics(e.g.
training, effort, benefit packages).
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distributionofhoursconstraintsG(h)isendogenously determined
in equilibrium, as we describe below.10
Workers. Workers, indexedby i, have quasi-linear utility
(1) ui (c,h) = c − α
−1/ε
i
h1+1/ε
1 + 1/ε
over a numeraire consumption good c and hours of work h. The
heterogeneous taste parameter αi > 0, is distributed according
toa smooth cdf F(αi) with full support on a closed interval. This
utilityspecificationeliminatesincomeeffectsandgeneratesacon-
stant wage elasticity of labor supply ε in a frictionless model. We
abstractfromincomeeffectsbecausethevariationinmarginaltax
rates at kinks that weexploit foridentificationhas littleeffect on
averagetaxratesandthusgeneratesnegligibleincomeeffects.We
extendtheanalysistoutilityfunctionsthatgeneratenon-constant
elasticities in Online Appendix A.
Tocharacterizetaxchangesthataffectsubgroupsofthepopu-
lationdifferently, assumethat therearetwotypes oftaxsystems,
indexed by s   {NL,L}.11 Individuals with si = NL face a two-
bracket non-linear tax system with marginal tax rates of τ1 and
τ2 > τ1. Theseworkersbegintopaythehighertaxratewhentheir
incomes wihi exceed a threshold K. Individuals with si = L pay a
lineartaxrateofτ onall income. Withthis taxsystem, individual
i has consumption
(2) ci(hi)=

 
 
(1 − τ1)min (wihi,K)+
(1 − τ2)max(wihi − K,0) if si = NL
(1 − τ)wihi if si = L
A fraction ζ of workers face the non-linear tax system NL and
the remainder (1 − ζ) face the linear tax system L. Let worker i’s
optimal level of hours be denoted by h 
i = arg maxhiui (c(hi),hi).
The tax systems workers face are uncorrelated with their tastes:
F(αi|si)=F(αi).
10. This endogenous determination of wage-hours offers differentiates this
model fromthefewexistingmodels of hours constraints, inwhichfirms’ technolo-
gies exogenously determine the distribution of wage-hours packages (e.g. Rosen
1976).
11. For example, tax systems often treat single and married individuals dif-
ferently, in which case the two types in our model would be defined by marital
status.
 
a
t
 
H
a
r
v
a
r
d
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
o
n
 
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
 
2
6
,
 
2
0
1
2
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
q
j
e
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 758 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Workers begin their search for a job by drawing an initial
offer h0
i from the aggregate offer distribution G(h). Each worker
caneitheraccept this offerorturnit downandsearchforanother
job. We assume that workers whosearch locate their optimal job
h 
i , but must pay a utility cost of search φi. As a result, workers
will search for their optimal job if and only if the gains from the
switcharelargerthan φi. This jobsearchprocess forworkers can
be viewed as a functional F that maps an aggregate distribution
of hours posted by firms G(h) and wage schedule w(h) to a new
distribution F(G(h),w(h)).
II.B. Equilibrium
To demonstrate that our testable predictions apply to both
competitiveandunionizedlabormarketssuchasthatofDenmark,
we analyze two different equilibrium concepts – one based on
collective bargaining andanother basedon market competition.
Model 1: Collective Bargaining. There is a single union that
represents all the workers in the economy. As in Earle and Pen-
cavel (1990), we assume that the union bargains with firms over
bothwages andhours, holdingfixedthenumberofavailablejobs.
Theunion’sobjectiveistomaximizeitsmembers’aggregateutility
subject totheconstraint that all members must findjobs (full em-
ployment). Since there are many firms and one union, the union
makesatake-it-or-leave-itoffertoallfirms, whomayacceptorde-
clineitindividually. Theworkersthensearchforjobsasdescribed
above. Iftherearemoreworkers thanfirms at agivenhours level
after the search process, jobs are randomly rationed to workers,
andhence some workers are unemployed.
In equilibrium, unions determine the wage andthe distribu-
tion of hours, subject to the constraints that firms must partici-
pate in the labor market and all workers are employed. Because
labordemandis infinitelyelastic, firms will not accept w > p, and
the unions impose w = p. In order to satisfy the full employment
constraint, theunionmust choosea distributionof jobs G(h) sat-
isfyingthefixed-point condition G  (h) = F (G (h),p). This condi-
tion ensures that the distribution of hours endogenously reflects
theaggregatedistributionofworkerpreferences. Ifmanyworkers
prefer to work 40 hours per week, the union bargains to induce
manyfirms toofferjobs that require40 hours oflaborperweekin
equilibrium.
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Model 2: Market Equilibrium. Ina decentralizedcompetitive
equilibrium,firmspostanhoursofferhj chosentomaximizeprofit:
(3) πj = phj − w(hj)hj.
Intuitively, firms seek to produce at an hours level where the
supply of labor exceeds demand, allowing them toearn profits by
payinga wagew(hj)< p. Becausefirms arefreetoenterthemar-
ket at any level of hours hj, profits are bid tozero, implying that
w(hj) = w = p for all hj in equilibrium. Market clearing requires
thatthedistributionofjobsinitiallypostedbyfirmscoincideswith
the jobs selected by workers at the wage rate w = p after the job
search process is complete, i.e. G (h)=F (G (h),p).
Both the market equilibrium and collective bargaining mod-
els generate a fixedwage w = p anda distribution of hours G (h)
thatendogenouslyreflectsthepreferencesofworkerswhileensur-
ingfull employment. Theonlydifferencebetweenthetwomodels
is the mechanism through which worker preferences are aggre-
gated togenerate G(h): through firms in the market equilibrium
model andthroughunions inthecollectivebargainingmodel. Be-
causethetwomodels generatethesameequilibriumhours distri-
bution, the predictions derived below apply to both institutional
structures of the labor market. The two models of wage setting
produce the same equilibrium because our model assumes that
labor demand is infinitely elastic. However, the key mechanisms
that drive our testable predictions would also operate in a more
realisticsettinginwhichthelabordemandelasticityis finiteand
unions extract rents. In particular, unions would continue to ag-
gregate the tax preferences of the workers they represent, lead-
ing to larger responses to tax changes that have large size and
scope.
Our model shouldbe viewedas representing the equilibrium
in a given sector or occupation. It is straightforward to generate
heterogeneous wage rates by introducing multiple sectors. Sup-
pose there are Q different skill types of workers and Q types of
corresponding output goods sold at prices p1,...,pQ. Workers of
type q can only work at firms that produce good q, so there is
nointeractionacross the Q segments of the labormarket. Within
each sector one union bargains with firms to set an equilibrium
wage rate wq = pq and an equilibrium hours distribution
determined by its workers’ preferences according to the model
above.
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Thefollowingsectionscharacterizethepropertiesoftheequi-
librium hours distribution G(h), focusing on the relationship be-
tween tax rates andlabor supply. For analytical convenience, we
derive the key predictions in a series of special cases.
II.C. Special Case 1: Benchmark Frictionless Model
Inthefrictionless model (φi=0), thestructural preferencepa-
rameter ε fully determines the effects of taxes on labor supply.
This is because workers who face no search costs always choose
their unconstrained optimal level of hours h 
i . For workers with
si = L, who face a linear tax τ, the optimal level of hours is h 
i =
αi ((1 − τ)w)
ε. The hours choices of workers who face the non-
linear tax system are given by
(4) h 
i =

  
  
αi ((1 − τ1)w)
ε if αi < α
hK = K
w if αi   [α,α]
αi ((1 − τ2)w)
ε if αi > α
whereα=hK/((1 − τ1)w)
ε andα=hK/((1 − τ2)w)
ε.Workerswith
moderate disutilities of labor supply αi   [α,α] bunch at the kink
because the net-of-tax wage falls at hK.12
Now consider how variation in the linear tax rate τ affects
labor supply. When subject to a higher tax rate, workers of type
si = L optimally reduce their work hours by
(5) dlogh = ε ∙ dlog(1 − τ).
This equation shows that the elasticity of hours with respect to
thenet-of-taxrate(1−τ)coincides withthestructural parameter
ε in the frictionless model. We shall therefore refer to ε as the
“structural”elasticity. Workers oftypes=NL, whoareunaffected
by τ, do not change hours of work and can be used as a control
groupin an empirical study.
In our one-dimensional labor supply model, the hours elas-
ticity coincides with the elasticity of taxable wage income (wh)
12. The logic for why a mass of workers bunch at the kink is captured by the
followingquotefromaDanishconstructionworkerinterviewedbyamemberofthe
DanishTaxReformCommission: “BytheendofNovember, someofmycolleagues
stop working. It does not pay anymore because they have reached the high tax
bracket.”
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withrespecttothenet-of-tax-rate: ε=
dlog wh
dlog(1−τ). Inpractice, income
taxes may distort choices beyond hours of work, such as train-
ing, effort, andfringebenefits. Itisstraightforwardtoincorporate
suchmarginsintothemodelbyassumingthatfirmspostjoboffers
that specify H characteristics (or tasks),
− →
h =(h1,...,hH), along
with wage rates − → w =(w1,...,wH) and workers have utility over-
characteristics ψ(h1,...,hH). In such a model, the analysis that
follows applies tothetaxableincomeelasticity ε=
dlog − → w∙
− →
h
dlog(1−τ) rather
than the hours elasticity.
In the stylized models we consider here, the taxable income
elasticityεistheparameterrelevantforanalyzingtaxpolicy(Feld-
stein 1999). In a more general union bargaining model with a fi-
nite labor demand elasticity, taxable income responses may be
driven partly by wage andemployment changes. For example, in
Hansen’s(1999)modeloftaxationwithbargainingoverwagesand
working hours, a higher marginal tax rate leads to lower wage
rates,shorterworkinghours,andhigheremployment.Intuitively,
when faced with an increase in tax rates, unions moderate their
wagedemandsinexchangeforalowerunemploymentlevel.While
the welfare implications of taxation woulddiffer in such an envi-
ronment, the three qualitative predictions derived below regard-
ing the impact of frictions on observed responses to tax changes
wouldstill apply.
The elasticity ε is most commonly estimated using variation
intaxrates fromtaxreforms (Blundell andMaCurdy1999; Saez,
Slemrod, andGiertz2009). However, ε canalsobeidentifiedfrom
cross-sectional variation in tax rates using non-linear budget set
methods (e.g. Hausman 1981). In particular, the amount of
bunching observed at kinks identifies ε (Saez 2010). Let BNL =
[F(α)−F(α)] denote the fraction of type si = NL individuals who
choose hi = hK. Let ˜ gNL(hK) denote the counterfactual density of
hours in the absence of the tax change at the kink, which can be
measured by the left limit of the density of the empirical hours
distributionfortypesi =NL individuals inthis simplemodel. Un-
der the approximation that the hours distribution gNL is uniform
aroundthe kink, Saez (2010) shows that
(6) ε  
BNL(τ1,τ2)/˜ gNL(hK)
K ln

1−τ1
1−τ2
 =
bNL(τ1,τ2)
K ln

1−τ1
1−τ2
.
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wherebNL = BNL/˜ gNL(hK) denotes thefractionof type si = NL in-
dividualswhobunchatthekinknormalizedbythecounterfactual
density. Intuitively, the fraction of individuals whostop working
at hi = hK hours because of the change in marginal tax rates is
proportional toε.
Animportant propertyof equations (5) and(6) is that theob-
servedelasticitycoincides with ε irrespectiveof themagnitudeof
the change in tax rates or the fraction of workers ζ affected by
the tax change.13 This result underlies microeconometric empir-
ical studies of labor supply that use changes in taxes that affect
subgroups of thepopulationtoidentify ε. Wenowshowthat with
searchcostsandhoursconstraints, observedelasticitiesvarywith
the size andscope of tax changes andnolonger coincide with ε.
II.D. Special Case 2: Search Costs and Worker Responses
In this subsection, we analyze the impact of search costs on
behavioral responses totaxation, abstractingfromchanges inthe
hours offered by firms. To isolate worker responses, we assume
that the set of workers affected by the tax change has measure
zero. Whenanalyzingbunchingatkinks, weassumethatthefrac-
tion of agents who face the non-linear tax system is ζ = 0; con-
versely, whenanalyzingtaxreforms, weassume ζ =1. Underthis
assumption, the tax change has noimpact on the equilibrium of-
fer distribution G(h) and only affects the treated workers’ hours
through changes in job search. To simplify notation, we assume
thatallworkersfacethesamesearchcostsφi=φ; theresultsbelow
donot rely on this restriction.
Under these assumptions, a worker searches for a newjob if
his initial offer h0
i /  
h
hi,hi
i
, where the thresholds are defined by
the equations:
u(ci(h 
i ),h 
i ) − u(ci(hi),hi) = φ with hi < h 
i (7)
u(ci(h 
i ),h 
i ) − u

ci(hi),hi

= φ with hi > h 
i (8)
Workerswhodrawhoursthatfallwithintheregion
h
hi,hi
i
retain
theirinitial offerbecausetheutilitygains fromworking h 
i hours
instead of h0
i hours are less than the cost of search φ. After the
13. Weusetheterm“taxchange”toreferbothtochangesintaxratesovertime
via reforms andchanges in marginal tax rates at kinks within a given period.
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searchprocess is complete, therearetwotypes ofworkers at each
firm j: a point mass whose optimal labor supply h 
i = hj is exactly
thatofferedbythefirmandadistributionofworkerswithoptimal
hours near but not equal tohj.
Now consider how the mapping from the amount of bunch-
ing at kinks to ε in (6) is affected by search costs. Let ˆ ε(τ1,τ2)=
BNL(τ1,τ2)/˜ gNL(hK)
K ln(
1−τ1
1−τ2) denotetheelasticityobtainedbyapplyingequation
(6). We shall refer to ˆ ε as the “observed”elasticity from bunching
at the kink. To understand the connection between ˆ ε and ε, first
recall that in the frictionless model (where φ = 0), workers locate
at thekinkif αi   [α,α]. Whenφ > 0, workers locateat thekinkif
αi   [α,α] and h0
i /  
h
hi,hi
i
.14 As a result, the observed elasticity
ˆ ε is smaller than the structural elasticity ε. As the size of the tax
change at the kink increases (τ1 falls or τ2 rises), the set of work-
ers withαi   [α(τ1,τ2),α(τ1,τ2)] whopaythesearchcost tolocate
at the kink expands:
(9)
∂[hi − hi]
∂τ2
< 0 and
∂[hi − hi]
∂τ1
> 0.
Because the equilibrium hours distribution G(h) is not affected
by τ1 and τ2 when ζ = 0, it follows immediately that ˆ ε rises with
τ2 − τ1. As τ1 → −∞ and τ2 → ∞, the inaction region
h
hi,hi
i
collapses tohK foragents withαi   [α,α] and ˆ ε → ε. Largerkinks
generate larger observed elasticities because the utility costs of
ignoring a kink increase with its size. Figure I illustrates this in-
tuition using indifference curves in consumption-labor space for
an agent who would optimally set hours at hK. The thresholds h
hi,hi
i
are where the budget constraint crosses the indifference
curve that yields utility φ units less than the maximal utility U .
Nowsupposeτ2 increases, movingtheupperbudgetsegmentfrom
the solid line to the dashed line. Then the upper bound hi de-
creases, whichinturnincreases ˆ ε. This is becausetheutilityloss
from supplying hours above the kink rises with τ2, as one earns
14. Workers whodrawh0
i  
h
hi,hi
i
donot contribute tothe point mass at the
kink because G(h) is smooth when ζ = 0. Therefore, among type si = NL workers,
theset whodrawaninitial hours offerh0
i =K/w has measurezero. G(h)is smooth
inthis casebecausethedistributionoftastes F(α)is smoothandtheset ofagents
whoface a smooth (linear) tax schedule has measure 1.
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FIGURE I
Bunching at Kinks with Search Costs
This figure illustrates how search costs affect bunching at kinks. The two-
brackettaxsystemcreatesthekinkedbudgetsetshownindarkgray. Theworker’s
indifference curves are shown by the light gray isoquants. This worker’s optimal
laborsupplyistoset h =hK, placinghimatthekink. Thelowerindifferencecurve
shows theoptimal utilityminus thesearchcost φ. If theworkers draws aninitial
hours offerbetweenh andh , hewill not payφ torelocatetothekink. As thetax
change at the bracket cutoff increases in magnitude (shown by the dashed line),
the inaction region shrinks to(h,h
 
), leading toa larger observed elasticity from
bunching.
less for this extra effort. These results lead to our first testable
prediction:
PREDICTION1: Whenworkersfacesearchcosts, theobservedelas-
ticityfrombunchingrises withthesizeof thetaxchangeand
converges toε as the size of the tax change grows:
(10) ∂ˆ ε/∂τ2 > 0, ∂ˆ ε/∂τ1 < 0, and lim
(τ2−τ1)→∞ ˆ ε = ε
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We derive an analogous prediction for observed elasticities
from tax reforms in Online Appendix A. Tax reforms generate
observed elasticities ˆ ε =
dlog h
dlog(1−τ) that differ from ε; as the size of
the tax reform grows, ˆ ε → ε. The intuition for this result is very
similartothatforbunching: manyworkerswillnotpaythesearch
costtofindajobthatrequiresfewerhoursfollowingataxincrease,
attenuating ˆ ε. However, unlike in the case of bunching, observed
elasticities from tax reforms need not always be smaller than ε.
For example, if workers are close tothe edge of their inaction re-
gions prior to the reform, a small tax change could lead to large
adjustments, generating ˆ ε > ε. Hence, observing that elasticities
risewiththesizeoftaxreforms is sufficient, but not necessary, to
infer that search costs affect observedelasticities.
Non-Constant Elasticities. If the utility function is not isoe-
lastic, onemayobserveanelasticity ˆ ε that increases withthesize
of the tax change even without search costs. We can distinguish
search costs from variable elasticities by comparing the effects of
several small taxchanges withtheeffects of a largerchangethat
spans the smaller changes. In Online Appendix A, we show that
with an arbitrary utility u(c,l) and tax rates τ1 < τ2 < τ3, the
amount ofbunchingat twosmallerkinks is equal tothebunching
createdat a single larger kink in the frictionless case (φ = 0):
BNL (τ1,τ3) = BNL (τ1,τ2) + BNL (τ2,τ3).
Thisisbecausetheamountofbunchingincreaseslinearlywiththe
sizeof thekinkwithout searchcosts, as shownin(6). Incontrast,
when φ > 0,
BNL (τ1,τ3) > BNL (τ1,τ2) + BNL (τ2,τ3).
Intuitively, agentsaremorelikelytopaythefixedsearchcost φ to
relocate tothe bigger kink, and thus it generates more bunching
and a larger observed elasticity than the two smaller kinks to-
gether. A similarresult applies totaxreforms: theobservedeffect
oftwosmalltaxreforms, eachstartingfromasteadystate, differs
from the effect of one large reform only when φ > 0. We exploit
these results toshowthat the differences in observed elasticities
wedocument inourempirical analysis aredrivenbysearchcosts
rather than changes in the local elasticity.
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Micro vs. Macro Elasticities. Searchcostsleadtoadivergence
between the elasticities observed from micro studies of tax re-
formsorbunchingandtheelasticitiesrelevantformacroeconomic
comparisons. In particular, the structural elasticity ε determines
thesteady-stateeffectofvariationintaxpoliciesacrosseconomies
on aggregate labor supply even with search costs. To see this,
consider two economies with different linear tax rates, τ and τ ,
for workers with si = L. To abstract from firm responses to this
taxvariation, assumethat theset of individuals facingthelinear
tax has measure zero(ζ = 1); we showthat the same result holds
withfirmresponsesinthenextsubsection. Wedefinetheobserved
macroelasticityastheeffectofthisdifferenceintaxratesonhours
of work:
b εMAC =
Eloghi(τ )−Eloghi(τ)
log(1 − τ )−log(1 − τ)
Forworkers whopaythesearchcost tochooseoptimal hours, the
difference in hours between the twoeconomies is
logh 
i (τ )−logh 
i (τ) = ε∙(log(1 − τ )−log(1 − τ))
Workers who retain their original hours draw h0
i have average
work hours of
R hi
hi hdG(h). Under a quadratic approximation to
utility, the movement in the inaction region is also determined
by ε:
∂ loghi
∂ log(1 − τ)
=
∂ loghi
∂ log(1 − τ)
  ε.
Under the approximation that the offer distribution G(h) is uni-
form between hi andhi,
Eloghi(τ )−Eloghi(τ)  ε∙(log(1 − τ )−log(1 − τ))
Itfollowsthat b εMAC   ε:themacroelasticityapproximatelyequals
the structural elasticity regardless of the search cost φ.
Thecriticaldifferencebetweenmicroandmacroelasticitiesis
that the former are identified from a worker’s decision to switch
jobsex-post becauseoftaxincentives, whereasthelatterareiden-
tifiedfromdifferencesinex-ante jobsearchbehavior. Searchcosts
reduceworkers’ propensitytofinetunetheirlaborsupplychoices
by bunching at kinks or responding to tax reforms because the
costs of deviating from optima are second-order. But workers
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searchforjobs withfewerhours tobeginwithinaneconomywith
highertaxrates.Consequently,ataxreformorakinkthatchanges
the marginal rate from τ toτ  generates a smaller observedelas-
ticitythanthesame “macro”variationintaxratesofτ vs. τ  across
economies.
II.E. Special Case 3: Hours Constraints and Firm Responses
We now show how changes in hours constraints affect ob-
served responses to tax changes. To highlight the importance of
aggregate bunching and obtain analytical results, we consider a
different special case of the model. First, we assume ζ  (0,1), so
that there is a positive measure of workers affected by both tax
systems. Second, we assume that at each level of αi, a fraction δ
ofworkers facenosearchcosts (φi =0)andtheremainingworkers
cannot search at all (φi = ∞).
Inthisspecialcase,workers’searchdecisionsaresimple:those
withφi=0choosehi=h 
i andthosewithφi=∞ havehi=h0
i , theirini-
tial hours draw. As aresult, theequilibriumdistributionofjobof-
fers G(h)coincides withthedistributionofoptimal hours choices,
G (h). ThereasonisthatthesearchprocessF mapsadistribution
of offers toF(G) =δG  +(1 − δ)G, and hence G  is the only fixed
point of F. Intuitively, workers with φi = 0 always choose their
optimal hours, and so the only offer distribution that is a fixed
point for them is G . As any offer distribution is a fixed point for
the φi = ∞ group, G  must be the aggregate hours distribution
in equilibrium. This result illustrates that hours constraints are
determinedbyworkers’ aggregatetaxpreferences inequilibrium.
Toseehowtheendogenousdeterminationofhoursconstraints
affects elasticity estimates, consider the observed elasticity from
bunching for the workers who face the non-linear tax (si = NL).
Let B 
NL(τ1,τ2) denote the total level of bunching that one would
observe in the frictionless model (δ = 1) for these workers. With
searchcosts (δ < 1), theobservedamount ofbunchingforworkers
with si = NL is:
BNL = δB 
NL+(1 − δ)ζB 
NL
Thetwoterms inthis expressionrepresent twodistinct sources of
bunching. Thefirst termarises fromworkers whochoosehi=h 
i =
hK becausetheyfacenosearchcosts. Thesecondtermarisesfrom
theworkers whoset hi = h0
i = hK becausetheyfaceinfinitesearch
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costs. Because the aggregate distribution of hours coincides with
the optimal aggregate distribution, a fraction ζB 
NL of the equi-
librium job offers have hours of hK. We label the first component
of bunching (BI
NL = δB 
NL) “individual bunching” because it arises
fromindividuals’choicestolocateatthekinkviajobsearch.15 We
label thesecondcomponent (BA
NL=(1−δ)ζB 
NL)“aggregatebunch-
ing”becauseitarisesfromtheaggregationofworkers’preferences
by either unions or firms.
The signature of aggregate bunching is that it generates
bunching even amongst workers who have no incentive to locate
at the kink. Consider workers with si = L, who face a linear tax
schedule and experience no change in marginal tax rates at hK.
Because of the interaction of hours constraints with search costs,
these workers alsobunch at the kink via the aggregate bunching
channel. These workers draw h0
i = hK with probability ζB 
NL and
are forced to retain that offer if φi = ∞. The amount of bunching
observed for workers with si = L is therefore BL =(1 − δ)ζB 
NL =
BA
NL. This equivalence between BL and BA
NL is useful empirically
because we cannot measure BA
NL directly (as we do not observe
search behavior), but we can measure BL since we do observe
workers’ tax schedules. Intuitively, any bunching among those
whodonot face a kink must represent aggregate bunching.
The observed elasticity from bunching for workers with
si = NL is:
ˆ ε =
BNL(τ1,τ2)/˜ g 
NL(hK)
K ln

1−τ1
1−τ2
 = δε+(1 − δ)ζε < ε
Theobservedelasticityissmallerthanthestructuralelasticitybe-
cause search costs prevent some workers whowould like tobe at
the kink from moving there.16 The observed elasticity rises with
15. A fraction (B 
NL)2 of workers with φi = 0 and h 
i = hK draw the h0
i = hK to
begin with and are therefore indifferent between retaining h0
i and searching for
their optimal job. To simplify notation, we classify these workers as “individual
bunchers”by assuming that they choose tosearch for a newjob.
16. In this special case, the total amount of bunching including all workers
(both L andNL) equals the amount of bunching in the frictionless case (δ = 0) be-
cause G(h)=G (h). However, the composition of those at the kink differs when
δ > 0: some of those who bunch face the linear tax. This is why ˆ ε < ε for work-
ers of type NL. In the general model where workers face finite adjustment costs,
G(h)/ =G (h) and total bunching no longer coincides with that in the frictionless
case.
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the scope of the kink ζ – the fraction of workers in the economy
who face the non-linear tax schedule. When more workers face
a change in tax incentives at an earnings level of K, firms are
compelledtooffermorejobs inequilibriumat hK hours tocaterto
aggregatepreferences. Thusakinkthataffectsmoreworkersgen-
erates more aggregate bunching BA
NL and thereby leads to more
total bunching anda larger observedelasticity ˆ ε.
Asthescopeofthekinkapproaches ζ=1, BNL → B 
NL and ˆ ε →
εinthisspecialcase.Conversely,asζ approaches0,BA
NL converges
to 0 because firms only cater to aggregate preferences. It follows
thatthebunchingobservedatkinksthataffectfewworkersinthe
economy constitutes a pure measure of individual bunching:
(11) lim
ζ→0
BNL = BI
NL
This equivalence between limζ→0 BNL and BI
NL is also useful em-
piricallybecausewecannot directlyobserve BI
NL, but canobserve
limζ→0 BNL bystudyingbunchingat kinks that applytofewwork-
ers.17 These results leadtoour secondtestable prediction.
PREDICTION 2: Search costs interact with hours constraints to
generate aggregate bunching. Aggregate bunching and the
observedelasticity rise with the fraction of workers whoface
the kink:
BA
NL = BL > 0 iff ζ > 0 (12)
∂BA
NL
∂ζ
> 0 and
∂ˆ ε
∂ζ
> 0.
The source of aggregate bunching is that the distribution of
jobsofferedinequilibriumreflectstheaggregationofworkers’tax
preferences. Therefore, in occupations where workers are more
tax elastic, one should observe a higher level of both individual
and aggregate bunching. To see this, consider the Q-sector ex-
tension of the model described above. The amount of individual
bunching in occupation q is BI
NL,q = δζB 
NL,q and the amount of
aggregate bunching is BA
NL,q = (1 − δ)ζB 
NL,q. As the structural
elasticity εq increases, the fraction of workers who would opti-
mally locate at the kink (B 
NL,q) increases, increasing both BI
NL,q
17. This is why the bunching in special case 2 above (where ζ = 0) is driven
purely by individual search behavior rather than aggregate responses.
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and BA
NL,q because δ and ζ are constant.18 This leads toour third
andfinal prediction.
PREDICTION 3: Theamount ofaggregatebunchingandindividual
bunching are positively correlatedacross occupations:
(13) cov

BI
NL,q,BA
NL,q

> 0
OnlineAppendixApresentsanalogsofpredictions2and3for
observedelasticities from tax reforms.
Micro vs. Macro Elasticities. The structural elasticity ε con-
tinuestodeterminethemacroelasticitywithfirmresponses. Con-
sider again the two economies with different linear tax rates, τ
and τ , for workers of type si = L. But nowassume that all work-
ers face the linear tax (ζ = 0), so that firms respond to this tax
variation. The results above imply that the difference in equilib-
riumhoursacrossthetwoeconomiescoincideswiththedifference
in optimal hours. It follows immediately that the difference in
average hours of work between the twoeconomies is
Eloghi(τ )−Eloghi(τ) =Elogh 
i (τ )−Elogh 
i (τ) =ε∙(logτ −logτ)
Hence, theobservedmacroelasticityequalsthestructuralelastic-
ity(b εMAC=ε)eveninthepresenceofcoordinateresponsestotaxes.
This result highlights a second reason that the macroeconomic
effects of taxes could be larger than microeconometricestimates.
Variation in tax rates across economies shifts the aggregate dis-
tribution of workers’ preferences and thereby induces changes in
the hours constraints set by firms. In contrast, tax reforms or
kinks that affect a small subgroup of workers do not generate
substantial changes in hours constraints.
Wederivedthethreepredictions inspecial cases becausethe
general model withfinitesearchcosts andendogenous hours con-
straints is analytically intractable. In Chetty et al. (2009) we use
numerical simulations toverifythat thethreepredictions holdin
the general case. The simulations alsoshowthat the macroelas-
ticityistypicallyclosetoε inthegeneralmodel. Wethereforepro-
ceedtotest the predictions empirically anddetermine the extent
18. If workers could switch between sectors, this correlation result would be
reinforced because more elastic workers would sort toward sectors with more
aggregate bunching.
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towhichadjustment costs andhours constraints attenuatemicro
elasticity estimates in practice.
III. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND DATA
The Danish labor market is characterized by a combination
of institutional regulationandflexibility, commonlytermed“flex-
icurity.” The vast majority of private sector jobs are covered by
collective bargaining agreements, negotiated by unions and
employer associations. The collective bargains set wages at the
occupationlevelasafunctionofseniority, qualifications, degreeof
responsibility, etc. The contracts are typically negotiated at
intervals of 2–4 years. Despite this relatively rigid bargaining
structure, rates of job turnover are relatively high and the un-
employment rate is relatively low. For example, Andersen and
Svarer(2007) report that rates of jobcreationandjobdestruction
for most sectors and the overall economy in Denmark are com-
parable to those in the U.S. The unemployment rate in 2000 in
Denmark was 5.4%, among the lowest in Europe.
During the period we study (1994–2001), income was taxed
using a three-bracket system. Figure IIa shows the tax schedule
in 2000 in terms of Danish Kroner (DKr). Note that $1 ≈ DKr 6.
Themarginaltaxratebeginsatapproximately45%, referredtoas
the“bottomtax.”19 AtanincomeofDKr164,300, a“middletax”is
leviedinadditiontothebottomtax. Thenet-of-taxwageratefalls
by 11% at the point where the middle bracket begins. Finally, at
incomesaboveDKr267,600, individualspaythe“toptax”ontopof
the other taxes, bringing the marginal tax rate toapproximately
63%. Thenet-of-taxwageratefalls by30% at thepoint wherethe
top bracket begins. Approximately 25% of wage earners pay the
top tax during the period we study. The large jump in marginal
tax rates in a central part of the income distribution makes the
Danish tax system particularly interesting for our purposes.20
FigureIIbplotsthemovementinthetopbracketcutoffacross
years in real and nominal terms. Danish tax law stipulates that
19. Individuals with incomes below DKr 33,000 are exempt from this bottom
tax; in practice, virtually all wage earners earn more than this threshold.
20. Denmark also has a complex transfer system that affects incentives for
lowincomes(KlevenandKreiner2006). Wedonotmodelthetransfersystemhere
becausetransferprogramsaffectveryfewindividuals’marginalincentivesaround
the middle andtoptax cutoffs that are the focus of our empirical analysis.
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FIGURE II
The Danish Income Tax System
Panel (a) plots the marginal tax rate in 2000 vs. income for individuals living
inCopenhagen, includingthenationaltax, regionaltax, andmunicipaltax. Panel
(b)plots thelevel oftaxableincomeabovewhichearners must paythetopbracket
national tax. Theseries indarkgraydiamonds, plottedontheright y-axis, shows
thenominalcutoff; theseriesinlightgraysquares, plottedontheleft y-axis, shows
the cutoffin real 2000 DKr.
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the movement in the toptax bracket from year t toyear t + 1 is a
pre-determinedfunctionofwagegrowthintheeconomyfromyear
t−2 toyeart−1 (two-yearlaggedwagegrowth). Thismechanical,
pre-determined movement of the cutoffs rules out potential con-
cerns that thebracket cutoffs maybeendogenouslyset as a func-
tion of labor market contracts. Over the periodof study, inflation
was between 1.8% and 2.9% per year. Because of the adjustment
rule, thetopbracket cutoffdeclines inreal terms from1994–1997
andthen increases from 1998–2001.
Inadditiontothevariationintaxratesacrossbrackets, there
were also some small tax reforms during the period we study.
For example, in 1994 and 1995, there were two separate middle
taxes that were consolidated into a single middle tax in subse-
quent years. Starting in 1999, net capital losses could not be de-
ductedfromthemiddletaxbaseandcontributionstocertaintypes
ofpensions couldnolongerbedeductedfromthetoptaxbase. Fi-
nally, themiddleandtoptaxbracket cutoffs changeinreal terms
across years. These tax reforms generate changes in net-of-tax
rates between −10% to+10% for certain subgroups, yielding sev-
eral tax changes of small size andscope.
Therearetwotaxbases relevant forouranalysis: oneforthe
top tax and one for the middle taxes. The top tax base depends
almost entirely on individual income; the middle tax base is a
function of household income. We study behavior at the individ-
ual level because our analysis focuses primarily on the top tax,
but we account for joint aspects of the tax system when relevant
(e.g. when studying the middle tax). We use the term “taxable
income” to refer to the tax base relevant to a particular tax; for
instance, when studying bunching around the top tax cutoff, we
use “taxable income” to refer to the top tax base.21 Wage earn-
ings, self-employment income, transfer payments, and gifts are
all subject toboththemiddleandtopincometaxes. Most pension
contributions are tax deductible and the marginal dollar of capi-
tal incomeis not subject tothetoptaxformost individuals. These
features of thetaxcodecreateanincentivetoshift earnings from
laborincometocapitalincomeandpensions.SeeMinistryofTaxa-
tion(2002)foramorecomprehensivedescriptionoftheDanishtax
system.
21. The Danish tax system includes a technical concept of “Taxable Income.”
Our use of the term “taxable income”does not refer tothat technical concept.
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Data. Wemergeseveral administrativeregisters providedby
Statistics Denmark. The primary dataset is the tax register from
1994-2001, which contains panel data on wage earnings, self-
employment income, pensions, capital income and deductions,
spouseID, andseveralothercharacteristics. Thetaxregistercon-
tainsrecordsformorethan99.9% ofindividualsbetweentheages
of15–70inthepopulation. WemergethetaxdatawiththeDanish
Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA), which
includes data oneducation, firmID, occupation, labormarket ex-
perience, and number of children for every person in Denmark.
Additionaldetailsonthedatasetandvariabledefinitionsaregiven
in Online Appendix B.
Starting from the population dataset, we restrict attention
to individuals who (1) are between the ages of 15 and 70 and (2)
are wage earners, excluding the self-employed and pensioners.22
Theseexclusions leaveus withananalysis sampleof 17.9 million
observations ofwageearners. Muchofouranalysis focuses onthe
subsetof6.8millionobservationsforwageearnersthatfallwithin
50,000 of the top tax cutoff. We also study the 1.8 million obser-
vations of self-employedindividuals separately.
Table I presents summary statistics for the population of
15–70 year olds as a whole, all wage earners, the subset of wage
earnerswithinDKr50,000ofthetoptaxcutoff, andself-employed
individuals. Themeanindividualpersonal(non-capital)incomein
the population is DKr 180,213 ($30,000) for the population
and DKr 227,359 ($38,000) for wage earners. Mean net capital
income is negative because mortgage interest payments exceed
capitalincomeformostindividuals. Wedefine“netdeductions”as
deductionsminusnon-wageincome(accountingforspousaldeduc-
tions), orequivalently, wageearningsminustaxableincome. Most
wageearnershavesmallnetdeductions(60%havedeductionsless
than DKr 7,500 in magnitude), a fact that proves useful for our
empirical analysis. The mean level of net deductions is negative
because some individuals have substantial non-wage income.
We construct a tax simulator that calculates tax liabilities
and marginal tax rates using these data. Given our focus on the
top tax base, we compute marginal tax rates for individuals (i.e.,
22. The endogenous sample selection induced by dropping the self-employed
does not spuriously generate bunching. There is significant bunching in the wage
earnings distributioneveninthefull population: b=0.73 inthefull populationvs.
b = 0.71 for the subgroupof wage earners reportedin Figure IIIa below.
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FIGURE III
Income Distributions aroundthe TopTax Cutofffor Wage Earners
Thesefigures showthetaxableincomedistributionaroundthetoptaxbracket
cutoff(demarcatedbythevertical lineat 0) forwageearners between1994–2001.
The series shown in dots is a histogram of taxable income (as defined for the top
tax base), relative to the top tax cutoff in the relevant year. Each point shows
the number of observations in a DKr 1,000 bin. The solid line beneath the em-
pirical distribution is a seventh-degree polynomial fitted to the empirical distri-
bution excluding the points DKr 7,500 or fewer from the cutoff, as in equation
(15). In Panel (a) the full sample is considered. The shaded region is the esti-
mated excess mass at the top bracket cutoff, which is 81% of the average height
of the counterfactual distribution beneath. Panel (b) considers married women
andsinglemen. Panel (c) considers school teachers (ISCO 2331) andthemilitary
(ISCO 1013).
the change in tax liability for a given individual holding fixed
spouse income) rather than households. We discuss below how
this individual measure of marginal tax rates affects our anal-
ysis of bunching at the middle tax cutoff, which depends upon
household income. Our tax simulator predicts actual tax liabili-
ties within DKr 5 (  $1) for 95% of the individuals in the popu-
lation. Over the period we consider, top marginal tax rates were
reduced slightly, and thus the simulated net-of-tax rate (holding
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TABLE I
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE DANISH POPULATION AND ESTIMATION SAMPLES,
1994–2001
Wage Earners <
Wage DKr 50,000 from Self
Population Earners toptax cutoff employed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demographics:
Age 40.91 39.17 41.43 46.02
Children 0.62 0.67 0.71 0.70
Labor market experience (yrs) 12.46 15.42 18.77 9.46
College education (%) 17.61 22.76 28.54 17.74
Female (%) 49.61 48.17 39.17 24.40
Married(%) 50.62 53.64 58.68 67.34
Income:
Wage earnings 149,254 236,478 269,340 38,343
Other personal income 42,642 9,408 2,747 153,467
Total personal income 180,213 227,359 251,145 188,854
Net capital income −10,672 −15,819 −19,570 −7,785
Deductions:
Net deductions −40,687 −13,151 −6,381 −31,996
|Net deductions| <7,500 (%) 43.25 59.36 69.11 23.84
|Net deductions-Pension kink| <7,500 (%) 2.03 2.72 2.96 5.07
Individual pension contributions 4,316 4,217 4,535 16,709
Employer pension contributions 7,584 12,065 13,131 2,123
Tax Payments:
Pred. liability accurate within 5 DKr (%) 95.11 94.83 94.47 93.62
Pays the middle tax (%) 50.38 74.23 95.57 45.48
Pays the toptax (%) 18.06 25.87 33.53 23.61
2-year growth in NTR(%) 1.68 2.25 2.25 1.07
Stddev of 2-year growth in NTR(%) 4.50 4.95 4.95 6.80
Number of Obs. 30,492,819 17,866,090 6,788,235 1,846,064
Notes. Tableentries aremeans unless otherwisenoted. Column1 is basedonthefull populationof Den-
markbetweenages 15-70 from1994-2001. Column2 includes all wageearners, theprimaryestimationsam-
ple. Column 3 includes only the subset of wage earners for whom |taxable income - toptax cutoff| <50,000,
i.e. the individuals in Figure 3. Column 4 considers individuals whoreport positive self-employment income.
All monetary values are in real 2000 Danish Kroner. Children are the number of children younger than 18
livingwiththeindividual. Personal incomerefers toall non-capital income. Net capital incomerefers tocap-
ital income minus payments such as mortgage interest. Net deductions refer to deductions from the top tax
base such as individual pension contributions minus non-wage income such as taxable gifts. Net of tax rate
is one minus the marginal tax rate predictedby our tax simulator.
fixed base-year characteristics) rises by 2.25% on average across
two-year intervals.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We begin by analyzing bunching at the top bracket cutoff,
wherenet-of-taxwages fall byapproximately30%. InFigure IIIa
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we plot the empirical distribution of taxable income for all wage
earnersinDenmarkfrom1994–2001.Toconstructthishistogram,
wefirstcalculatethedifferencebetweentheactualtaxableincome
and the taxable income needed to reach the top tax bracket for
each observation. We then groupindividuals intoDKr 1,000 bins
(−500 to500, 500 to1500, etc.) onthis recenteredtaxableincome
variable. Finally, we plot the bin counts around the top bracket
cutoff, demarcatedby the gray vertical line at zero.
Thefigureshows that thereis aspikearoundthetopbracket
cutoff in the otherwise smooth and monotonically declining in-
come distribution. As shown in equation (6), the observed elas-
ticity b ε implied by this bunching is proportional to b(τ1,τ2), the
excess mass relative tothe density around the kink K. A compli-
cation in measuring b empirically is that the excess mass around
K is diffuse rather than a point mass, presumably because it is
difficult to control wage earnings perfectly. To measure b in the
presence of such noise, we must estimate a counterfactual
density – what the distribution would look like if there were no
change in the tax rate at K. To do so, we first fit a polynomial to
thecounts plottedinthefigure, excluding thedata nearthekink,
by estimating a regression of the following form:
(14) Cj =
q X
i=0
β0
i ∙(Zj)i +
R X
i=−R
γ0
i ∙ 1[Zj = i] + ε0
j
whereCj isthenumberofindividualsinincomebinj, Zj isincome
relative to the kink in 1,000 Kroner intervals (Zj = {−50,−49,..,
50}), q is the order of the polynomial, and R denotes the width
of the excludedregion aroundthe kink (measuredin DKr 1,000).
Let BN denotetheexcess numberof individuals wholocateat the
kink. Wedefineaninitial estimateof thecounterfactual distribu-
tion as the predicted values from (14) omitting the contribution
of the dummies around the kink: b C0
j =
Pq
i=0 b β0
i ∙(Zj)i. The excess
number of individuals who locate near the kink relative to this
counterfactual densityis b B0
N =
PR
j=−R Cj − b C0
j =
R P
i=−R
b γ0
i . This simple
calculation overestimates BN because it does not account for the
factthattheadditionalindividualsatthekinkcomefrompointsto
therightofthekink. Thatis, itdoesnotsatisfytheconstraintthat
the area under the counterfactual must equal the area under the
empirical distribution. To account for this problem, we shift the
counterfactual distribution to the right of the kink upward until
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it satisfies theintegrationconstraint. Inparticular, wedefinethe
counterfactual distribution b Cj = b βi∙(Zj)i as the fitted values from
the regression
(15) Cj∙(1 + 1[j > R]
b BN P∞
j=R+1 Cj
)=
q X
i=0
βi∙(Zj)i +
R X
i=−R
γi ∙ 1[Zj = i] + εj
where b BN =
PR
j=−R Cj − b Cj =
R P
i=−R
b γi is the excess number of indi-
viduals at the kink impliedby this counterfactual.23 Finally, we
define our empirical estimate of b as the excess mass around the
kinkrelativetotheaveragedensityofthecounterfactualearnings
distribution between −R andR:
(16) b b =
b BN
PR
j=−R
b Cj/(2R + 1)
Thesolidcurveinthefigureshowsthecounterfactualdensity{b Cj}
predictedusing this procedure with a seventh-degree polynomial
(q = 7) and a window of DKr 15,000 centered around the kink
(R=7).Theshadedregionshowstheestimatedexcessmassaround
thekink. Withtheseparameters, weestimateb = 0.81– theexcess
mass aroundthekinkis 81% oftheaverageheight ofthecounter-
factual distributionwithinDKr7,500 ofthekink. Thequalitative
results we report below are not sensitive to changes in q and R
or the way in which we correct the counterfactual to satisfy the
integration constraint. The reason is that the differences we doc-
ument in observed elasticities are much larger than the changes
inducedby varying the specification of the counterfactual.
We calculate a standard error for b b using a parametricboot-
strapprocedure. Wedrawfromtheestimatedvectoroferrors ξj in
(15) with replacement to generate a new set of counts and apply
thetechniqueabovetocalculateanewestimate ˆ bk. Wedefinethe
standarderrorof ˆ b asthestandarddeviationofthedistributionof
ˆ bks. Sinceweobservetheexact populationdistributionof taxable
income,thisstandarderrorreflectserrorduetomisspecificationof
the polynomial for the counterfactual income distribution rather
23. Because b BN is a function of e βi, the dependent variable in this regression
depends upon the estimates of e βi. We therefore estimate (15) by iteration, recom-
puting b BN using the estimated e βi until we reach a fixed point. The bootstrapped
standarderrorsthatwereportbelowadjustforthisiterativeestimationprocedure.
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thansamplingerror. Thestandarderrorassociatedwithouresti-
mateofb is 0.05. Thenull hypothesis that thereis noexcess mass
at the kink relative to the counterfactual distribution is rejected
with a t-statisticof 17.6, implying p < 1 × 10−9.
There is substantial heterogeneity across groups in the
amount of bunching. Figure IIIb shows that excess mass at the
kink is much larger for married women (b = 1.79) than for sin-
glemen(b=0.25), consistent withexistingevidencethat married
women exhibit the highest labor supply elasticities.24 Figure IIIc
shows that there is also substantial heterogeneity across occu-
pations: teachers exhibit substantial bunching around the kink
(b = 3.54), whereas the military does not (b = −0.12, statistically
insignificant).25 We return to explore the sources of this hetero-
geneity in Section IV.B below.
The identification assumption underlying causal inference
about the effect of taxes on earnings in the preceding analysis
is that the income distribution would be smooth if there were no
jump in tax rates at the location of the top bracket cutoff. This
identification assumption can be relaxed by exploiting the move-
mentinthetopbracketcutoffacrossyears. FigureIVdisplaysthe
distributionoftaxableincomeineachyearfrom1994–2001 forall
wage earners and for married women. The excess mass for both
groupsfollowsthemovementinthetopbracketcutoffveryclosely.
In Figure V, we investigate whether the excess mass tracks tax
changes, inflation, oraveragewagegrowthovertime. Weconsider
theperiodfrom1997 to2001, duringwhichthetoptaxcutoffrises
in real terms. Noting that the excess mass is located at the top
taxcutoffin1997, thefigureshows threepossibilities forits loca-
tion in 2001: the 2001 top tax cutoff, the 1997 cutoffadjusted for
inflation, andthe1997 cutoffadjustedforaveragewagegrowthin
the economy. In both the full population of wage earners andthe
subgroupofmarriedwomen, theexcessmassthatwasatthe1997
kink clearly moves to the 2001 kink rather than following infla-
tionoraveragewagegrowth. Thesamepatternisobservedduring
otherperiodswhenthetoptaxcutoffisdeclininginrealterms(see
24. Inprinciple,thebunchingformarriedwomencouldbeexaggeratedbywage
payments from self-employed husbands seeking to reduce their tax liabilities. In
practice, we find that the amount of bunching is virtually unchanged when we
exclude households with at least one self-employedperson from the sample.
25. Approximately50% ofwageearners inDenmarkworkinthepublicsector.
Wefindslightlymorebunchingforthoseemployedintheprivatesector(b = 0.67)
than those in the publicsector (b = 0.5).
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FIGURE IV
Income Distributions Aroundthe TopTax Cutoff, 1994–2001
Thesefiguresplottheempiricaldistributionoftaxableincomeforwageearners
andmarriedfemalewageearners ineachyearfrom1994–2001. Inall panels, the
upperdistributionis formarriedwomenandthelowerdistributionis forall wage
earners. Thesolidvertical lines markthetoptaxbracket cutoff(innominal DKr)
in each year. The figure also shows the counterfactual distributions and excess
masses, computedas in Figure IIIa.
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FIGURE V
Distinguishing Changes in Tax Incentives from Inflation andWage Growth
ThisfigurereplicatestheincomedistributioninFigureIV(h)fortheyear2001,
zooming in around the top tax bracket cutoff. The location of the bracket cutoff
in 2001 is marked with the solid line. The dashed light gray line shows the level
of the 1997 top bracket cutoff adjusted for inflation. The dashed dark gray line
shows the 1997 bracket adjustedfor average wage growth.
Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix). Earnings dynamics around
the toptax bracket depart from prevailing inflation patterns and
insteadarealignedwithchanges inthetaxsystem. Weshowthat
firmresponses explainwhytheexcess mass tracks themovement
of the kink soclosely despite frictions in Figure XI below.
Shifting vs. Real Responses. Individuals can obtain taxable
incomenearthetopbracket cutoffthroughtwomargins: changes
inlaborsupply(e.g. hours worked)or“incomeshifting”responses
such as changes from taxed to untaxed forms of compensation.
Our three theoretical predictions about how frictions affect ob-
servedtaxableincomeelasticitiesholdregardlessofwhatmargins
underlie changes in taxable income. Intuitively, if firms face
technological constraints that limit the benefit packages workers
canchoosefrom, taxchangesoflargersizeandscopewillcontinue
to produce larger taxable income elasticities. Nevertheless, it is
useful to distinguish between these two behavioral responses
because income shifting and “real” changes in labor supply have
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different normative implications (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002;
Chetty 2009).
Therearetwochannelsthroughwhichindividualscanchange
theirreportedtaxableincomewithoutchanginglaborsupply: eva-
sionandavoidance. Klevenet al. (2010)studyauditedDanishtax
records and find that there is virtually no tax evasion in wage
earnings because of third-party reporting by firms. We find that
thereissubstantialbunching(b = 0.68)eveninwageearnings(see
Figure A.2). We therefore conclude that the bunching we observe
is not driven by evasion.
The second and more important income shifting channel is
legal tax avoidance. The simplest methodof reducing current tax
liabilities is tocontribute totax-deductible pension accounts. We
investigate the extent of such shifting by adding employer and
employee pension contributions back to taxable income. We find
thatthedistributionofthisbroadermeasureofcompensationstill
exhibits substantial bunching relative to the statutory top tax
bracket cutoff that would apply to individuals with zero pension
contributions, rejecting the hypothesis that all of the bunching
observed in taxable income is driven by shifts to pensions (see
Figure A.2).We conclude that pension shifting is responsible for
onlyasmallamountofthebunchingintaxableincomeweobserve
atthetoptaxcutoff. Therelativelysmallamountofpensionshift-
ingis likelydrivenbythegenerosityof Denmark’s social security
programs. An analogous exercise shows that shifting intocapital
income, which is untaxed in the top tax base, is responsible for
virtually none of the bunching at the topkink.
Althoughthebehavioralresponsesatthetoptaxcutoffdonot
appeartobedrivenbyanyobservablemethodof incomeshifting,
we cannot rule out the possibility that individuals shift their
compensation tounobservable nontaxable compensation toavoid
paying the topincome tax. For example, we cannot detect substi-
tution of compensation from wage earnings into office amenities
when individuals cross into the top tax bracket. We also cannot
rule out intertemporal shifting of wage earnings to avoid paying
the top tax. The only way to definitively rule out such responses
is to examine changes in hours worked directly. Unfortunately,
ourdatasetdoesnotcontaininformationonhoursofwork. Never-
theless, we believe that most of the observedbunching in taxable
income reflects “real” distortions in behavior that have efficiency
costs. Few salaried workers at the 75th percentile of the income
distribution have the ability to shift income into other forms of
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FIGURE VI
Income Distributions aroundthe Middle Tax Cutoff
Panels (a) and (c) plot the empirical distributions of taxable income (as de-
finedforthemiddletaxbase) aroundthemiddletaxcutoff, wherenet-of-taxwage
rates fall byapproximately10%. Panel (b)plots thedistributionofwageearnings
around the middle and top tax cutoffs. Panels (a) and (b) include all wage earn-
ers, while panel (c) includes only married female wage earners. All panels show
counterfactual distributions andexcess masses, computedas inFigure IIIa. Each
panelalsoreportstheamountofbunchingpredictediftheelasticitywerethesame
as that estimated from the amount of bunching at the top bracket cutoff for the
corresponding income measure andsubgroup.
compensationoracrosstime(Slemrod1995;Goolsbee2000).More-
over, evenifcompensationis distortedtowardofficeamenities in-
stead of wages, the marginal efficiency cost of such distortions
equals the marginal efficiency cost of changes in hours of work
(Feldstein 1999).
IV.A. Prediction 1: Size of Tax Changes
We now test the first prediction by comparing the amount
of bunching at the top tax kink with bunching at smaller kinks
and observed elasticities from small tax reforms. Figure VI
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shows the distributions of taxable income around the middle tax
cutoff, where the net-of-tax rate falls by approximately 10%.26
FigureVIashowsthatthereisvirtuallynobunchingatthemiddle
tax cutoff (b= 0.06) in taxable income for the full population of
wage earners. Moreover, the estimated excess mass at the mid-
dle tax converges to zero as the degree of the polynomial is in-
creased, whereas theestimatedexcess mass at thetopkinkis not
sensitive tothedegreeof thepolynomial. Becausethedefinitions
of “taxable income” differ for the top and middle tax bases, Fig-
ureVIbplotsthedistributionofwageearningsaroundbothkinks.
Consistent with Figure VIa, there is significantly more bunching
at the top kink than the middle kink in wage earnings. Figure
VIc shows that the amount of bunching remains small and sta-
tistically insignificant even for the subsample of marriedwomen,
who exhibit substantial bunching at the top kink as shown in
Figure IIIb.
Note that smaller kinks should generate less bunching even
inthefrictionless model, simplybecausethechangeinincentives
issmaller. Wethereforecomparetheexcessmassatthesesmaller
kinks with the amount of excess mass that wouldbe generatedif
the elasticity were the same as that implied by the excess mass
at the large top tax kink. In all cases, the amount of bunching
observed in the empirical distribution at the middle kink is sig-
nificantly less than what would be predicted by the frictionless
model. For example, the frictionless model predicts b = 0.16 at
the middle kink for all wage earners (Figure VIa). The null hy-
pothesis that the predicted excess mass equals the actual excess
mass at the middle kink can be rejectedwith p < 0.01.
Next, we estimate observed elasticities using changes in
marginal rates by legislated reforms. As described in Section III,
several small tax reforms in Denmark between 1994 and 2001
created changes in net-of-tax rates of between −10% and +10%.
These reforms generate differential changes in net-of-tax rates
across income groups, motivating a difference-in-difference
research design. Let Δlogyi,t = logyi,t − logyi,t−2 denote the log
changeinwageearningsfromperiodt−2totandΔlog(1−MTRi,t)
the log change in net-of-tax rates over the same period. Follow-
ingGruberandSaez (2002), weestimatethefollowingregression
26. In 1994 and 1995, the tax system includes an additional “upper middle
tax.”Figure VI only considers the lower middle tax in these years, but there is no
bunching at the upper middle tax cutoffeither.
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specification using two-stage-least-squares:
(17) Δlogyi,t = α + βΔlog(1 − MTRi,t) + f(yi,t−2) +γXi,t−2 + εi,t,
instrumenting for Δlog(1 − MTRi,t) with Δlog(1 − MTRsim
i,t ), the
simulated change in net-of-tax rates holding the individual’s in-
comeandothercharacteristics fixedat theiryear t−2 levels. The
functionf(yi,t−2)isa10-piecelinearsplineinbaseyearwageearn-
ingsandthevectorXi,t−2 isasetofbaseyearcontrolsthatwevary
across specifications. First-stage regressions of Δlog(1 − MTRi,t)
on Δlog(1 − MTRsim
i,t ) have coefficients of approximately 0.6 with
t-statistics exceeding 600.
TableIIreportsTSLSestimatesfromseveralvariantsof(17).
In column (1), we estimate (17) on the full population of wage
earners with the following controls: the 10-piece wage earnings
spline, a10-piecesplineintotalpersonalincomeandageandyear
fixedeffects. The estimatedelasticity b ε is very close to0, andthe
upper bound of the 95% CI is b ε = 0.004. Column (2) adds a 10-
piece capital income spline, gender and marital status dummies,
andoccupationandregionfixedeffects as controls. Theestimated
elasticity remains very close to zero, showing that the estimates
are robust tothe set of covariates usedtopredict income growth.
Column (3) considers the subgroup of married women using the
baselinespecificationincolumn(1). Theobservedelasticityinre-
sponse to small tax changes remains near 0 for married women
despitethefactthattheyexhibitsubstantialbunchingatthelarge
top tax kink, as shown in Figure IIIb. In column (4), we further
restrict the sample tomarried women whoare professionals and
haveabove-median(morethan19years)labormarketexperience.
This subgroup also does not react significantly to small tax re-
forms,yetitexhibitssubstantialbunchingatthetopkink(b=4.50,
implying b ε = 0.06).
Insum, ouranalysisconfirmsthatlargertaxchangesproduce
largerobservedelasticities. However, theelasticityimpliedbythe
frictionless model remains very small even at the largest kink.
Theobservedelasticityfrombunchingat the30% kinkis b ε   0.01
forall wageearners and b ε   0.02 formarriedwomen. Webelieve
that these elasticity estimates remain substantially attenuated
relativetoε becausetheutilitylossfromignoringthe30% change
intaxratesatthetopkinkisonlyaround2%ofconsumptiongiven
a structural elasticity of ε = 0.5 (Chetty 2011).
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Search Costs vs. Non-Constant Elasticities. If ε(τ,z) varies
with τ or z, the evidence that larger tax changes generate larger
observed elasticities could potentially be explained by variation
in ε rather than adjustment costs. In our application, the middle
kinksareatincomesofDKr130,000–177,900, whilethetopkinks
areat incomes of DKr234,900–276,900. If higherincomeindivid-
uals are more elastic, one would observe more bunching at the
top kink even without frictions. We distinguish this explanation
of our findings from frictions using three approaches.
First, we test whether taxable income elasticities differ by
income by interacting Δlog(1 − MTRi,t) with yi,t−2 (re-centered
aroundthe toptax cutoff). Column (5) of Table II shows that this
interaction effect is small and insignificant (p =0.52), indicating
that there is no significant heterogeneity in observed elasticities
by income. As an alternative approach to assessing heterogene-
ity, we replicate the baseline specification in column (1) restrict-
ing the sample toindividuals with wage earnings exceeding DKr
200,000. Column (6) shows that the estimated elasticity remains
very close to zero, confirming that small tax changes do not gen-
erate significant behavioral responses even for individuals facing
the toptax.
Second, we examine how the degree of bunching changes as
the middle and top tax cutoffs move across years. In the latter
years of oursample, the middle tax cutoffis higherin the income
distribution, but the amount of bunching remains near zero (not
shown). Incontrast, bunchingatthetopkinkremainssubstantial
in all years (Figure IV).
As a third test of whether preference heterogeneity drives
the differential bunching at the middle and top kinks, we focus
on a subset of individuals whose incomes place them within DKr
50,000 ofthetopkinkinyeart andwithinDKr50,000 ofthemid-
dlekinkinyeart+2. Bystudyingthese“switchers,”wecaneffec-
tively remove individual fixed effects when comparing responses
tothemiddleandtopkinks. Wefindthat whennearthetopkink,
theseswitchers exhibit substantial bunching(b=0.54). However,
just twoyears later, thesameindividuals shownoexcess propen-
sitytobunchatthemiddlekink(b=0.06)despitehavingearnings
near that kink (see Figure A.3). The opposite pattern is observed
forthosemovingfromthemiddletothetopkink.Weconcludethat
variation in observed elasticities is unlikely to explain the posi-
tive relationshipbetween larger tax changes andlarger observed
elasticities.
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Jointness of the Middle Tax Cutoff. Asnotedabove,theDanish
tax system has more elements of jointness at the middle kink
than the topkink. In particular, spouses can transfer deductions
between each other to minimize their middle tax liabilities, ef-
fectively making the middle tax a function of household income.
Our individual-based measure of bunching at the middle tax is
accurate if individuals make wage earnings decisions based on
their own tax liabilities. However, our method could in princi-
ple understate the amount of bunching at the middle tax cutoff
if spouses choose their earnings levels to minimize the tax bur-
dens of the household as a whole rather than their own liability.
As we explain in Online Appendix B, our method of computing
bunchingeffectivelycomputes thehigherearner’s distancetothe
kink based on the joint tax liability of the household rather than
theindividual. Wefindthatbunchingatthetoptaxcutoffremains
significantly larger than at the middle tax cutofffor the subsam-
ple of individuals whoare either the higher earner in a couple or
are single (see Figure A.4). This result confirms that the differ-
ences in observed elasticities at the top and middle kinks shown
in Figures III and IV are robust to the way in which we account
for the jointness of the middle kink.27
Perceptions of the Middle vs. Top Cutoffs. What are the costs
that workers faceinrespondingtotaxincentives? Onepossibility
isthecostofpayingattentiontotaxes(e.g. ChettyandSaez2009).
FigureA.5reportsthedistributionofperceivedmiddleandtoptax
cutoffobtained from an internet survey of 3,299 individuals who
weremembers ofa unionrepresentingpublicandfinancial sector
employees (FTF-A).28 Thefigureshows that knowledgeof thetop
tax cutoffis better than the middle tax cutoff. The same qualita-
tive pattern is exhibited across all education levels and occupa-
tions in the sample. These survey responses must be viewed as
anecdotal evidence because the survey was administered only to
members of FTF-A and because the response rate is low (11%).
Nevertheless, this evidence is consistent with our finding that
27. Afurtherconcernisthatittheremaybedifferencesinthecostsofbunching
at joint vs. individual kinks. For instance, jointness may allow the spouse with
lower adjustment costs (e.g. the secondary earner) tochoose a job that places the
householdat the kink. Such effects wouldwork against finding more bunching at
the topkink than the middle kink.
28. We thank Anders Frederikssen for making these data available
tous.
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observed elasticities are larger at the top kink than the middle
kink.
IV.B. Prediction 2: Aggregate Bunching and Scope of Tax Changes
Totestthesecondprediction, webeginbyidentifyingasource
of variation in the scope of kinks – the fraction of workers in the
economy who face a given kink in the tax system. Recall that
taxable income is the sum of wage earnings and non-wage in-
come minus deductions. Deductions consist primarily of pension
contributions. Non-wage income includes items such as alimony
receipts, stipends, and unemployment benefits. Because of het-
erogeneity in non-wage income and deductions, the wage earn-
ings required to reach the middle and top brackets vary across
individuals.
Approximately 60% of wage earners have net deductions
(deductions minus non-wage income) less than DKr 7,500 in
magnitude (see Figure A.6). This is because most individuals in
Denmarkmakenotaxdeductiblepensioncontributions andearn
only wage income. Thus, most individuals cross into the top tax
bracket when their wage earnings exceed the top tax cutoff that
applies totaxable income, which we term the “statutory” top tax
cutoff. The distribution of deductions for the remaining 40% of
individuals is diffuse, with one important exception. There is a
masspointinthedistributionofdeductionsatapproximatelyDKr
33,000, whichis drivenbyacapontax-deductiblepensioncontri-
butions. Individuals whomakepensions contributions upthecap
(approximately 2.7% of wage earners) reach the top tax bracket
onlywhentheirwageearnings exceedthestatutorytoptaxcutoff
by DKr 33,000.
In this setting, the secondprediction of our model consists of
threeparts: weshouldobserve(1) significant aggregatebunching
at the statutory top tax kink that applies to 60% of workers, (2)
little aggregate bunching at the “pension kink” that applies to
2.7% ofworkers, and(3)morebunchingforindividualswithsmall
deductions, as they have more common tax preferences. To test
these hypotheses, we study wage earnings distributions at the
occupation level because most wages are set through collective
bargains at the occupation level in Denmark.
Aggregate bunching is easiest to see through case studies
of occupations. Consider school teachers, who constitute
approximately 3% of wage earners in Denmark and form one of
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FIGURE VII
Teachers’ Wage Earnings Distributions
These twofigures plot the empirical distribution of wage earnings aroundthe
statutorytoptaxcutoffin1994–2001for(a)allteachers(ISCO2331)and(b)teach-
ers with net deductions greater than DKr 20,000.
thelargestunions.FigureVIIaplotsthedistributionofwageearn-
ings aroundthe toptax bracket for teachers. There is very sharp
bunching aroundthe statutory toptax cutoff, consistent with the
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sharp bunching in taxable income shown in Figure IIIc.29 Intu-
itively, the rate of return to negotiating for higher wages falls
discontinuously for the vast majority of teachers at the top tax
bracket cutoff. It is therefore sensible that the teachers union
starts bargaining on other dimensions, such as lighter teaching
loads or more vacations, rather than continue to push for wage
increases beyondthis point.
FigureVIIbplots thedistributionof wageearnings (salaries)
around the statutory top tax cutoff for teachers with net deduc-
tions greater than DKr 20,000. The individuals in this figure do
not begin to pay the top tax on wage earnings until at least DKr
20,000 beyond the statutory top tax cutoff, and therefore expe-
rience no change in net-of-tax wages at the vertical line at zero.
Yet thewageearnings distributionfortheseworkers is extremely
similar to the distribution for teachers as a whole, and exhibits
sharp bunching at the statutory top tax cutoff. This is the signa-
ture of aggregate bunching: even individuals who are unaffected
byakinkbunchthere.Inourmodel,thosewithdeductionsgreater
thanDKr20,000 effectivelyhavetype si =L aroundthestatutory
kink; Figure VIIb shows that bL = bA
NL > 0. Intuitively,
school districts offer a limited number of wage-hours packages
in order to coordinate class schedules. Because of such techno-
logical constraints, teachers’ contracts cater to the most
common tax incentives in the population (i.e., those with small
deductions).
There are similar patterns of aggregate bunching in many
other occupations. We generalize from such case studies by ana-
lyzing the modes of the earnings distribution in each occupation,
defined using four digit International Standard Classification of
Occupations(ISCO)codes. Wedefinethemodeineachoccupation-
yearcell as theDKr5,000 wageearnings binthat has thelargest
numberofworkers. FigureVIIIshowsahistogramofthesemodes
relative tothe toptax bracket cutoff, excluding small occupation-
years that haveless than7,000 workers (25% of thesample). The
density of modes drops sharply at the top tax threshold. There
are 20 modes within DKr 2000 of the toptax cutoff, but only 6 in
29. ThesmallerpeakabovethekinkisdrivenbyteachersinCopenhagen, who
receive a cost-of-living adjustment of approximately DKr 15,000 over the base
teacher’s salary. The setting of salaries to place teachers outside Copenhagen –
whoaccount for75% of all teachers – at thetopkinksupports theviewthat insti-
tutional constraints are endogenously set based on the preferences of the largest
groups in the population.
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theadjacentbinfromDKr2,000toDKr6,000abovethekink. This
dropinthefrequencyofmodesacrossthesetwobinsislargerthan
anyotherdropacrosstwocontiguousbinsinthefigure. Moreover,
as the top tax cutoff rises over years, the distribution of modes
shifts along with the cutoff(not shown). Hence, aggregate tax in-
centives – which are determined largely by the preferences of
workers whoface the statutory cutoff– shape the distribution of
jobs offers.
Having established the prevalence of aggregate bunching at
the most common kink, we test whether kinks that affect fewer
workersgeneratelessaggregatebunching.Todoso,weexploitthe
“pension kink”describedabove. Figure IXa plots the distribution
of wage earnings relative to the pension kink (shown by the
vertical line at 0) for individuals who have deductions greater
FIGURE VIII
Modes of Occupation-Level Wage Earnings Distributions
Toconstruct this figure, we calculate the mode of the wage earnings distribu-
tion in each occupation-year cell, defined as the DKr 5,000 bin with the most in-
dividuals inthat occupation-year. Occupations aredefinedby4 digit ISCO codes.
The figure shows a histogram of these modes, excluding occupations with fewer
than 7000 workers.
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than DKr 20,000. There is significant bunching in wage earnings
at the top tax pension kink (b = 0.70).30 Toinvestigate whether
thisbunchingisdrivenbyaggregationofworkers’taxpreferences
or individual job search, Figure IXb replicates IXa for workers
with deductions between DKr 7,500 and DKr 25,000. Note that
theseworkers’taxincentiveschangeatneitherthestatutorykink
northepensionkink. Theseworkers exhibit noexcess propensity
tolocate near the pension kink (b = −0.01), implying that there
is little aggregate bunching at the pension kink. In contrast, Fig-
ureIXcshowsthatthesame workersexhibitsubstantialbunching
aroundthe statutory kink (b = 0.56), confirming that there is sig-
nificantaggregatebunchingatthestatutorykink. Together, these
figures offer twolessons. First, the bunching at the pension kink
is driven by individual job search – i.e., finding a job that pays
DKr 33,000 above the top kink – rather than distortions in the
distribution of offers. Second, aggregate bunching is significant
only at kinks that affect large groups of workers, consistent with
themodel’spredictionthatthedistributionofjoboffersistailored
tomatch aggregate worker preferences.
Oneof thereasons that 60% of individuals facethestatutory
toptaxkinkisthatthetoptaxisbasedonindividualearnings.The
scope of the middle tax cutoffis smaller because it depends upon
householdincome; 38% ofindividualsintheeconomybegintopay
themiddletaxwhentheirincomecrossesthestatutorymiddletax
cutoff. This raises theconcernthat theremaybeless bunchingat
themiddlekinkthanthetopkinknot just becauseit has smaller
sizebutalsobecauseithassmallerscope. Todistinguishsizefrom
scope, we compare bunching at the middle tax pension kink (the
pointatwhichindividualswhoareatthepensioncapbeginpaying
the middle tax) with bunching at the top tax pension kink. Both
of these kinks affect very few workers in the economy (i.e. have
scope near zero), but the top tax pension kink is much larger in
size than the middle tax pension kink. We find that there is no
bunching (b = −0.01) in wage earnings at the middle tax pension
30. We condition on having deductions greater than DKr 20,000 toisolate the
relevant part of the population in order to detect bunching at the pension kink.
Toallaytheconcernthat conditioningondeductions greaterthanDKr20,000 cre-
atesselectionbias, weverifiedthatconditioningondeductionsinthepreviousyear
produces similarresults (b = 0.54). Wealsorana series of placebotests condition-
ing on having deductions above thresholds ranging from −20,000 to 40,000 and
found nobunching at any points in the wage earnings distribution except for the
statutory kink andthe pension kink.
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FIGURE IX
Individual vs. Aggregate Bunching at the Pension Kink
Panel (a) plots the distribution of wage earnings relative to the pension kink
(demarcated by the light gray vertical line) for wage earners with greater than
DKr 20,000 of net deductions. The pension kink is definedas the toptax bracket
cutoffplus themaximumtax-deductiblepensioncontributionineachyear. Panel
(b) replicates (a) for wage earners with between DKr 7,500 and DKr 25,000 of
net deductions. Panel (c) plots the distribution of wage earnings relative to the
statutory top kink (demarcated by the dark gray vertical line) for wage earners
withbetweenDKr7,500 andDKr25,000 innet deductions. Thefigurealsoshows
the counterfactual distributions andexcess masses, computedas in Figure IIIa.
kink(seeFigureA.7),supportingprediction1byshowingthatsize
matters holding scope fixed.31
We now turn to the third part of prediction 2: do workers
with small deductions bunch more than those with large deduc-
tions?Theeconometricchallengeintestingthis predictionis that
31. The lack of individual bunching at the middle tax pension kink also ex-
plains why there is noaggregate bunching at the middle tax kink: firms have no
reason to offer jobs at the kink if workers themselves do not demand such jobs.
Firm responses amplify bunching only if the kink is large enough toinduce indi-
vidual bunching tobegin with.
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deductions themselves are endogenous. In particular, workers
with large deductions may have chosen their deductions in order
to reach the top tax kink. We address this endogeneity problem
using a grouping instrument. We compute the fraction of work-
ers with deductions less than DKr 7,500 in magnitude for cells of
thepopulationdefinedbymaritalstatus, gender, year, andage(in
decades). Wethendivideworkers intotenequal-widthbins based
on the fraction of workers with small deductions in their group
andestimate the degree of bunching at the topkink (b) for work-
ers in each of these ten bins.32 Figure X plots the estimated b vs.
the fraction of workers with small deductions in the ten groups.
Thegroupswithsmalldeductionsexhibitmuchgreaterbunching:
the slope of the fitted line in Figure X is statistically significant
with p < 0.01. This result confirms that tax incentives that af-
fectalargergroupofworkersgeneratelargeobservedelasticities.
Workers withsmall deductions canrelyonaggregatebunchingto
reach the top kink, whereas workers with large deductions need
toactively search for a less common job.
Furthersupportingtheimportanceofaggregatebunching,we
find that some of the heterogeneity in elasticities across
demographicgroups (as in Figure IIIb) is driven by occupational
choice.Forinstance,reweightingmen’soccupationstomatchthose
of women’s eliminates 50% of the gap in observed elasticities be-
tween men andwomen (see Online Appendix Figure A.8).
Changes intheaggregatedistributionofjoboffers alsoshape
earningsdynamicsasthetaxbracketchanges. Tocharacterizede-
fineanindicatorforwhetheranindividual’schangeinwageearn-
ings from year t to year t + 2 is within DKr 7500 (the width of
our bunching window) of the change in the toptax bracket cutoff
from year t toyear t + 2. This indicator measures whether an in-
dividual tracks the movement in the kink over time. Figure XIa
plots the fraction of individuals who track the movement in the
kinkvs. thelevel ofwageearnings inthebaseyearrelativetothe
statutorykink. Thepropensitytotrackthemovement inthekink
is highest for individuals near the kink tobegin with. Figure XIb
replicatesFigureXIaforthepensionkink, focusingonindividuals
with deductions greater than 20,000 in year t, as in Figure IXa.
Individuals at the pension kink in year t do not have any excess
32. Weexcludegroups witha fractionof workers withsmall deductions inthe
bottomandtop5% ofthedistribution, astherearetoofewobservationstoestimate
b in equal-width bins in the tails.
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FIGURE X
ObservedElasticities vs. Scope of Tax Changes
Toconstruct this figure, we first calculate the fraction of individuals with net
deductions less than DKr 7,500 in magnitude in each age-gender-marital status-
yearcell. Wethengroupindividualsinto10equal-widthbinsbasedonthefraction
with small deductions in their group as described in the text. We estimate the
excess mass at the top kink as in Figure IIIa and apply equation (6) to calculate
observedelasticities for each of the ten groups. The figure shows a scatter plot of
theobservedelasticities vs. thefractionwithsmall deductions inthe10 bins. The
best-fit line is estimatedusing OLS.
propensitytotrackthemovementinthepensionkink.Instead,ag-
gregate bunchers at the statutory kink (locatedat approximately
DKr−33,000 inFigure XIb), exhibit a higherpropensitytomove
with the kink even though they have no incentive to do so. In
sum, individualswhoreachthekinkviaaggregatebunchingmove
withthekinkwhereas thosewhoget therethroughindividual job
search do not. Intuitively, firms adjust the packages they offer
as the aggregate distribution of workers’ tax preferences change,
whereasworkersmustpaysearchcoststoswitchjobsandactively
track the kink themselves.33
33. Theseresults alsoprovidefurtherevidencethat thedifferenceinbunching
at thetopandmiddlekinks is not drivenbyheterogeneous elasticities. If individ-
uals near the toptax cutoffwere simply more elasticanddidnot face adjustment
costs, they wouldtrack the movement of the topkink over time.
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FIGURE XI
Dynamics of Earnings Aroundthe TopTax Cutoff
These figures show how the propensity to track the movement in the top tax
cutoffacrossyearsvariesacrossindividuals. ToconstructPanel(a), wefirstdivide
individuals intobins ofDKr1000 inwageearnings inagivenyear t, andcalculate
the fraction in each bin whose change in wage earnings from a year t tot + 2 falls
withinDKr7,500 ofthemovementinthetoptaxbracketcutofffromyeart tot + 2.
Panel (a) plots this fraction for wage earnings bins around the statutory top tax
cutoff. Panel (b) replicates (a) forthepensionkink, restrictingthesampletowage
earners with net deductions greater than DKr 20,000. It shows the fraction of in-
dividuals whosechangeinwageearnings falls withinDKr7,500 of themovement
in the pension kink for wage earnings bins aroundthe pension kink.
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We conclude that firm responses play a central role in shap-
ing the effects of tax changes on equilibrium labor supply. Such
responses maybeparticularlyeasytodetect inDenmarkbecause
collective bargaining facilitates the aggregation of workers’ tax
preferences. While collective bargaining is less common in
economiessuchastheU.S.,technologicalconstraintsleadtohours
constraints in all labor markets. The general lesson to be drawn
from the evidence here is that these constraints are endogenous
tothe tax regime.
IV.C. Prediction 3: Correlation Between Individual
and Aggregate Bunching
We test the third prediction of the model by examining the
correlation between individual and aggregate bunching across
occupations.Asabove,wemeasureaggregatebunchingbA
q inoccu-
pation q by measuring the excess mass in the wage earnings dis-
tribution at the statutory top tax cutofffor individuals whohave
more than DKr 20,000 in deductions (and therefore have no in-
centive to locate at the statutory kink). We measure individual
bunching bI
q by the excess mass at the pension kink in the wage
earnings distribution for individuals in occupation q with more
than DKr 20,000 in deductions, because this kink has near-zero
scope(ζ   0). NotethatbA
q andbI
q areestimatesofbunchingattwo
different kinksforthesamegroupofindividuals, andthusarenot
mechanically related.
FigureXII plots theestimates of bA
q vs. estimates of bI
q across
occupations defined at the 2 digit ISCO level. The (unweighted)
correlationbetweenbA
q andbI
q is0.65 andissignificantlydifferent
from0withp < 0.001.Inaregressionweightedbyoccupationsize,
64% ofthevariationinbA
q isexplainedbythevariationinbI
q. Note
that the fewnegative point estimates of bI
q and bA
q are not signif-
icantly different from zero. We cannot interpret the positive cor-
relation in Figure XII as evidence that differences in individuals’
preferences cause changes in the distribution of jobs offered as
they could also be driven by sorting of workers into occupations
thatsuittheirtastes.Nevertheless,theevidenceisconsistentwith
themodel’spredictionthatfirms(orunions)catertoworkers’tax-
distortedpreferences in equilibrium.
IV.D. Self-Employed Individuals
Theself-employedareausefulcomparisongroupbecausethey
facemuchsmallerfrictionsinadjustingtaxableincomethanwage
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FIGURE XII
Correlation Between Individual andAggregate Bunching
This figure plots the amount of aggregate bunching (bA
q) vs. the amount of in-
dividual bunching(bI
q) forall International StandardClassificationof Occupation
codesatthetwodigitlevel. Bothaggregateandindividualbunchingareestimated
onthesubgroupofindividuals withnet deductions greaterthanDKr20,000, as in
Figure IXa. Individual bunching is the excess mass at the pension kink for this
group, whileaggregatebunchingis theexcess mass at thestatutorytoptaxcutoff
for the same group. See Table A.1 for a list of the occupation codes.
earners. Theyarenotsubjecttohoursconstraintsanddonotneed
tosearchforadifferentjobtochangetheirearnings. Theycanalso
easilychangereportedtaxableincomes, eitherbyshiftingrealized
income across years or by under-reporting taxable incomes.34
Therefore, weexpectthatthemodel’sthreepredictionsshouldnot
apply tothe self-employed.
Figure XIII replicates the key graphs shown above for the
self-employed. Figure XIIIa shows that the self-employedexhibit
extremely sharp bunching at the top kink, consistent with their
ability to adjust their income more easily. The estimated excess
mass is b = 18.4 at the top kink, dwarfing the excess mass
34. The Danish tax code allows the self-employed toshift some income across
years legally.
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FIGURE XIII
Self-EmployedIndividuals
These figures include only individuals who report positive self-employment
income. Panels (a)and(b)plot thetaxableincomedistributionaroundthetopand
middle cutoffs from 1994–2001. Panel (c) plots the distribution of realized self-
employment income around the statutory top tax cutoff for individuals with net
deductions greaterthan20,000. Panel (d) replicates Figure X forindividuals with
positive self-employment income, with the y axis scaled to have the same range
relative tothe mean observedelasticity as in Figure X.
for wage earners and implying an observed elasticity of 0.24.
Figure XIIIb shows that unlike wage earners, the self-employed
alsobunchsharplyatthemiddletaxkink. Theobservedelasticity
at themiddlekinkis 0.10. Webelievethat theobservedelasticity
at the middle kink is smaller than that at the top kink because
capital income is subject to the middle tax but not the top tax.
Self-employed individuals are allowed to reclassify some of their
profits as capital income, creatinganaddedmarginofresponseat
thetoptaxcutoff. Consistentwiththisexplanation, self-employed
individualswithcapitalincomelessthanDKr1,000 inmagnitude
have an observed elasticity of 0.16 at the middle kink vs. 0.20 at
the topkink.
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Figure XIIIctests for aggregate bunching by plotting the in-
comedistributionaroundthestatutorykinkforself-employedin-
dividuals with deductions larger than DKr 20,000. Unlike wage
earners, self employed individuals with large deductions exhibit
no excess mass around the statutory kink. As a result, self
employedindividuals withcommontaxpreferences (small deduc-
tions) bunch just as much as those with uncommon tax prefer-
ences (large deductions). This is shown in Figure XIIId, which
is constructed using mean group deductions in the same way as
Figure X.
These “placebo tests” confirm that our three predictions do
not apply to the self-employed.35 Some of the bunching among
theself-employedisdrivenbyintertemporalshiftingandevasion.
LeMaireandSchjerning(2007)demonstrateusingthesameDan-
ishdatathattheself-employedadjusttheirretainedearningsand
profit distributions over time toremain belowthe toptax thresh-
old in each year. Kleven et al. (2010) uncover substantial tax
evasion among the self-employed and estimate that 40% of the
bunchingatthetopkinkisdrivenbytaxevasion. Eliminatingthis
evasion component of bunching at the top kink implies a
taxable income elasticity for the self employed of 0.14. Regard-
less of which margin the self employeduse, we can conclude that
frictions significantlyattenuateobservedelasticities: thesizeand
scopeoftaxchangesmatterslessformarginsofbehaviorwithlow
frictions (changing reported taxable income or self-employment
earnings) than for margins with higher frictions (changing wage
earnings).
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has shown that the effects of tax policies on labor
supply are shaped by adjustment costs and hours constraints
endogenously chosen by firms. Because of these forces, modern
microeconometric methods of estimating elasticities – focusing
onpolicychanges that affect a subgroupof workers – mayunder-
estimate the “structural” elasticities that control steady-
state responses.
35. Furthermore, we find that individuals who switch between self-
employment andwageearninghavea muchgreaterpropensitytobunchat kinks
in the years when they are self employed.
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Ourempiricalanalysisdoesnotyieldanestimateofthestruc-
tural (macro) elasticity. In Chetty et al. (2009), we calibrate a
moregeneralversionofthemodelpresentedhere.Wefindthatthe
structuralelasticitythatmatchestheevidenceisanorderofmag-
nitude larger than the observed elasticity at the top kink. Intu-
itively, asmall ε cannotproducesubstantialvariationinobserved
elasticities across tax changes of different size andscope because
thecosts of deviatingfromoptimal hours areverylargewhen ε is
small. In future work, it would be useful to identify ε more pre-
cisely by structurally estimating a more realistic dynamic model
of labor supply with frictions.
It would also be interesting to explore the normative impli-
cations of adjustment costs andfirm responses. For example, the
efficiencycost ofataxleviedononegroupofworkers maydepend
not just upon their elasticities but also upon those of their
co-workers if firms are constrained to offer similar packages to
different workers. Another example concerns the prediction that
it is optimal tolevyhighertaxrates onmenthanwomenbecause
theyareless elastic(BoskinandSheshinski1983; Alesina, Ichino
andKarabarbounis 2007; Kleven, Kreiner, andSaez 2009). If the
differenceinobservedelasticitiesacrossgendersiscausedbyhet-
erogeneityinoccupational frictions ratherthantastes, theremay
be less justification for higher taxes on secondary earners in
steady state.
Finally, the results here call for caution in using quasi-
experiments that apply to small subgroups to learn about the
effects of economicpolicies on behavior. In settings with rigid in-
stitutional structures and frictions in adjustment, the steady-
state effects of policies implemented at an economy-wide
level could differ substantially from the effects of such
experiments.
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